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In present-day industrialized econ-
omies, inﬂation has been characterized as
low and stable, but generally positive and
expected to remain positive. In part be-
cause of this, the papers presented at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ twenti-
eth annual Economic Policy Conference
were brought together under the rubric
“Price Stability and Ecomonic Growth.”
Our intent was to focus discussion on core
issues in monetary theory and policy.
Speciﬁcally, we wanted to get a feel for
current thinking on the research frontier
as to whether, and to what extent, low-to-
moderate inﬂation might have a lasting
impact on economic growth. Should poli-
cymakers in the largest industrialized
countries move aggressively to squeeze the
remaining inﬂation from their economies?
If so, on what theoretical or empirical
basis can such action be justiﬁed? And if
not, what is it that makes a policy of indef-
inite low-to-moderate inﬂation a desirable
outcome?
As the conference participants con-
ﬁrmed, the answers to these questions dif-
fer markedly depending on what types of
mechanisms one wishes to emphasize in
creating a macroeconomic model, or on
the statistical techniques one wishes to
employ in conducting a macroeconomet-
ric study. And certainly monetary econo-
mists are far from providing a compelling
analytical framework that would unite the
thinking of economic researchers on these
matters with that in the international
business community, in ﬁnancial markets,
and among leading policymakers. But
even if that holy grail seems far from
being attained, there is a great deal to
learn from these papers, which might be
viewed as reﬂecting the economic profes-
sion’s slow-but-steady progress toward co-
herent thinking about macroeconomic
systems in which monetary policy and in-




Two papers presented at the confer-
ence addressed, from different perspec-
tives, the question of including aspects of
ﬁnancial intermediation in fully articulated
macroeconomic models. In “Inﬂation, Fi-
nancial Markets and Capital Formation,”
authors Sangmok Choi, Bruce D. Smith,
and John H. Boyd work in the context of
an equilibrium model in which higher in-
ﬂation reduces real rates of return received
by agents that save, and through this chan-
nel monetary policy can have an important
inﬂuence on the level of real activity and
capital formation. They de-emphasize the
direct effects of this mechanism, however,
to study its effects when interacting with
an adverse selection problem in ﬁnancial
markets. In particular, lower real rates of
return discourage saving and encourage
borrowing, and in this model the new bor-
rowers entering are of lower quality, since
they have higher default risks. Lenders re-
spond to this dismaying lower return,
higher-risk situation by rationing credit, so
that higher inﬂation often leads to more
severe rationing, less capital formation,
and a lower level of real activity.
The results obtained in this environ-
ment are notable for their nonlinearity.
A threshold effect exists in that, at low
rates of inﬂation, the adverse selection
problem has no effect on the equilibrium
set of the model; therefore, easier mone-
tary policy leads to higher inﬂation and a
higher level of real activity. Beyond a
threshold level of inﬂation, however, the
informational friction begins to play an
important role. Thus, when inﬂation is too
high, credit is rationed, and further in-
creases in inﬂation only serve to exacer-
bate the adverse selection problem. This
leads to less capital formation and a lower
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level of real activity. In addition, the equi-
librium set is much more complicated in
the high-inﬂation case, so that the model
predicts endogenously arising volatility in
inﬂation if the monetary policy supports
inﬂation rates that are higher than the
threshold. Development traps—situations
where economies are stuck in equilibria
with a low level of real activity—are also a
more likely outcome for economies with
high-inﬂation policies. Choi, Smith, and
Boyd argue that these predictions are con-
sistent with element of the historical
record as well as recent empirical work,
and the authors also present some addi-
tional empirical evidence to bolster their
case. They stress that similar results have
been obtained in related research that em-
phasizes alternative informational frictions
in ﬁnancial markets: The key feature is not
the friction itself, but the friction is exac-
erbated by higher inﬂation.
In a discussion of the paper, Pamela
Labadie notes the restricted nature of the
parameter space governing the model. Ac-
cording to Labadie, a key condition for ex-
istence of monetary steady states may not
hold in practice, in which case credit ra-
tioning would not occur, and most of the
interesting results emphasized by Choi,
Smith, and Boyd would not be observed.
Satyajit Chatterjee adds that the authors do
not include any stochastic features in the
model, so that highly variable unantici-
pated inﬂation cannot drive the relation-
ship between high inﬂation and the level of
real activity, even though that is the mecha-
nism many economists have in mind.
In the second paper, titled “Inﬂation,
Growth, and Financial Intermediation,”
V.V. Chari, Larry E. Jones, and Rodolpho
Manuelli conduct a quantitative-theoretic
investigation of a range of endogenous
growth models in which there is a well-
deﬁned demand for money. The authors
begin by citing elements of the empirical
literature that have suggested a negative
relationship between average inﬂation and
long-run real output growth of 0.2 to 0.7
percentage points for every 10 percentage
points of inﬂation. They accept estimates
on this order of magnitude as constituting
a stylized fact, and then turn to study a 
set of well-known endogenous growth
models—augmented in standard ways to
motivate a demand for money—to ﬁnd 
a class of equilibrium models that repli-
cate the stylized fact when calibrated to
the postwar U.S. experience. The cross-
product of possible endogenous growth
mechanisms with methods of introducing
money creates an initial matrix of 12 pos-
sible models. The results of this search
are negative: Quantitative versions of
these models cannot deliver such a large
effect of average inﬂation on the long-run
rate of economic growth.
The authors then address this puzzle
by introducing a form of regulated ﬁnan-
cial intermediation into the models. In
particular, banks face reserve require-
ments, and the intermediated capital they
provide is an imperfect substitute for other
forms of capital. By itself, this does not
provide enough of a distortion to match
the stylized fact according to the quantita-
tive experiments considered by the au-
thors, because increased inﬂation alone
does not have a substantial enough effect
on growth. But when rates of monetary ex-
pansion are altered in concert with
changes in reserve requirements in a way
that is consistent with the empirical rela-
tionship between these policy changes
found in the data (reserve requirements
tend to rise when inﬂation rises), the
quantitative effect on economic growth ap-
proaches the lower bound given by the
stylized fact. Chari, Jones, and Manuelli
conclude that models that include an im-
portant role for ﬁnancial intermediation
might provide the most promising avenue
for future research on the relationship be-
tween average inﬂation and the long-run
rate of economic growth.
In his remarks on this paper, Gary
Hansen points out that the authors are
interested, above all, in a reasonably cali-
brated case of a theoretical framework 
in which inﬂation adversely affects the
long-run growth rate of real output. Since
the models themselves are generally not
limiting in this regard—inﬂation does ad-
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calibration is providing the constraint. Ac-
cording to Hansen, the authors might
proﬁtably spend more time thinking about
appropriate parameter values, especially
for key parameters that have not been ex-
tensively researched. Alan Stockman is
skeptical of the results, concluding that
the authors overstate the magnitude of the
relationship between inﬂation and real
output growth found in the empirical liter-
ature, which often confuses level with
growth rate effects. He adds that the au-
thors insist on a calibration based on the
postwar U.S. experience, whereas the em-
pirical research uses data from a broad
cross-section of countries. This could be
leading the authors to falsely reject classes
of models which may in reality be fully
consistent with the empirical evidence.
POLICY RULES
Two papers at the conference empha-
sized policy rules as an optimal method of
conducting monetary policy. In “Discre-
tion, Rules and Volatility,” Costas Azariadis
and Vincenzo Galasso analyze certain types
of restrictions on median voting that can
improve equilibrium outcomes in a dy-
namic, inﬁnite-horizon economy populated
by ﬁnitely lived agents playing a transfer
payments game. The restrictions they study
are constitutional rules under which a mi-
nority has veto power over policy changes
proposed by the majority. They interpret
such a scheme as a form of partial precom-
mitment. Azariadis and Galasso stress that
the issues they address in the context of a
ﬁscal policy question apply with equal 
force to all issues with an intergenerational
dimension, including the maintenance of
price stability .
In the model, the discretionary regime
corresponds to pure majority voting in
which the largest political block can en-
force policies that reduce the consumption
of the smaller political block. This regime
has many equilibria, some of which in-
volve volatile or cyclical consumption pat-
terns. The indeterminacy is traced directly
to the inability of voters to commit succes-
sive generations to a particular policy. The
less discretionary regime in the model cor-
responds to a type of constitutionalism
under which it is harder to change policies
inherited from the past. In this setting,
knowledge of the past policy setting helps
predict the course of future policy. The
equilibrium set in this case is character-
ized by social optima free of ﬂuctuations.
Azariadis and Galasso argue that better
understanding of the consequences of
completely versus partially discretionary
policy in contexts like theirs holds many
lessons for policy design in the United
States and other industrialized countries.
In a discussion of the paper, Robert
Becker emphasizes that a key assumption
driving the success of the rules regime in
eliminating volatility is that the constitu-
tion is in place before time begins. What is
it that caused the agents to agree to be
bound by the constitutional arrangement?
Russell Cooper praises the paper for its
rich dynamics and clear statement of equi-
librium outcomes. Cooper suggests that
the agents’ agreement to be bound by the
complex political process of a constitu-
tional system might be justiﬁed by intro-
ducing costs of changing policy.
Inﬂation targeting is a particular 
type of monetary policy rule that has at-
tracted considerable interest among the
world’s central bankers. Robert King and
Alexander Wolman study the effects of in-
ﬂation targeting on equilibrium outcomes
in their paper, “Inﬂation Targeting in a 
St. Louis Model of the 21st Century.”
They adopt a framework in which sticky
prices play a central role because ﬁrms
behave as monopolistic competitors. A
representative, inﬁnitely-lived household
maximizes expected utility over time-
separable, consumption-leisure bundles. 
A well-deﬁned demand for money is in-
troduced via a shopping time technology.
There is an exogenously given price-
setting structure, meant to capture impor-
tant aspects of observed price adjustment,
such that ﬁrms can change their posted
prices only infrequently and are otherwise
constrained to satisfy demand at their
posted prices. Monetary policy has real ef-
fects in this model in the short run.King and Wolman study optimal long-
run inﬂation policy ﬁrst. In this type of
model, there is an unambiguous welfare
gain for the representative consumer if in-
ﬂation is increased above the rate that
would constitute the Friedman rule—a
zero nominal interest rate scenario. Some
may use this fact to argue for the optimality
of positive nominal interest rates in a fully
articulated macroeconomic model. But 
the computational experiments King and
Wolman conduct, using a conventional cal-
ibration, show that the welfare-maximizing
rate of inﬂation in this model is quantita-
tively very close to the Friedman rule
across a number of assumptions on the
pace of price adjustment, the magnitude of
the markup, and the parameters in the
shopping time technology. The authors
then turn to studying an inﬂation-targeting
rule as a method of coping with business
cycle shocks arising from disturbances to
both productivity and money demand. The
inﬂation-targeting regime is of an extreme
form—the money supply is manipulated in
such a way that inﬂation never varies from
its target—to get a feel for the potential of
such a rule. They ﬁnd that the economy
under the inﬂation targeting regime be-
haves almost the same, in a welfare sense,
as the model in which no sticky price prob-
lem exists. The inﬂation targeting policy
rule also outperforms a constant money
supply rule.
Julio Rotemberg praises the paper,
noting in remarks that the welfare conse-
quences of alternative policy rules are ac-
tually worked out in a Keynesian-style
model, and that this level of rigor in ana-
lyzing policy has frequently been missing
in models within this tradition. But he
also takes issue with the thrust of the
paper, arguing that while low and stable
inﬂation is probably a good idea, such a
conclusion does not necessarily follow
from the analysis carried out by the au-
thors. Edward Prescott notes that the
model studied by the authors has nearly
equal average rates of return to capital
and short-term government debt, which
contradicts available evidence. He ﬁnds
this prediction worrisome for a model




Three papers at the conference ad-
dressed the issues from an international
perspective. The ﬁrst paper in this group,
entitled “Search-Theoretic Models of Inter-
national Currency,” by Albert Trejos and
Randall Wright, provides a summary and
analysis of a two-country, two-currency
model of monetary exchange. The authors
emphasize that search-based models of
money are, in principle, well-suited to pro-
viding answers to key policy questions in
international monetary economics, in part
because the important issue of which cur-
rency is held by whom is decided endoge-
nously in this framework. The paper be-
gins with a presentation of the standard
two-country, two-currency model in this
class, along with a discussion of the possi-
ble conﬁgurations of the equilibrium set.
Three possible regimes are identiﬁed, and
likely conditions for their existence given,
corresponding to (1) each currency is held
by agents in the home country only—
dollars in the United States and pesos in
Mexico, (2) each currency is held in each
country, and (3) one currency is held in
both countries but the other currency is
held only in the home country. For much
of the parameter space of the model, more
than one regime is possible, so much so
that multiple equilibria is the rule rather
than the exception. Trejos and Wright
then turn to a discussion of their exten-
sion of this model, in which the helpful
but unsatisfactory assumption that all
trades are one-for-one swaps is relaxed by
allowing divisible output. They again ana-
lyze the conditions under which each of
the three regimes exist as stationary equi-
librium outcomes, and again, much of the
parameter space is characterized by multi-
ple equilibria.
In a section of the paper on policy 
implications, Trejos and Wright give some
examples of policy questions that can 
be proﬁtably addressed in this search-
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welfare gains to be had from currency uni-
ﬁcation, for instance, but there is also the
possibility that one country would experi-
ence a welfare loss. Future research might
therefore be able to provide an interesting
analysis of this type of issue in the case
where countries differ in terms of prefer-
ences or production technologies.
Remarks on the paper by Joseph Ritter
mention the pervasiveness of multiple
equilibria in the model and encourage the
authors to pursue the idea of monetary
policy regimes tailored to the goal of
equilibrium coordination. Ritter also
points out that while the original search-
theoretic models of money featured en-
dogenous currency holding, in this more
recent vintage, agents are forced to use
currency to accomplish trade. Neil Wallace
praises the paper and offers remarks on as-
sumptions he would like to see changed or
relaxed. Among these are the assumptions
that consumption precedes production, as
well as the fact that currency is indivisible,
coupled with the limitation on individual
holdings.
The two remaining papers offer per-
spectives on the international empirical
evidence regarding inﬂation and economic
growth. The paper by Michael Bruno and
William Easterly, “Inﬂation and Growth:
In Search of a Stable Relationship,” sum-
marizes the research in this area, with
special emphasis on the authors’ recent
ﬁndings with respect to inﬂation crises.
Bruno and Easterly deﬁne a high-inﬂation
crisis as a span of two or more years in
which the annual inﬂation rate exceeds
40 percent in a given country. In their
data set, they ﬁnd 32 such crises scattered
among 26 countries, and they regard
these episodes as discrete experiences
which they wish to analyze independently.
Typically, inﬂation is very high during the
crisis—on average exceeding 100 percent
at an annual rate—before falling back to
an average of 20 percent once the crisis
subsides. By considering these episodes
independently, Bruno and Easterly are
able to document a simple and robust
pattern: The pace of economic growth
falls precipitously during the crisis and
resumes—and even exceeds the pre-crisis
growth rate—once the crisis is over.
The authors go on to argue that re-
sults like these can help in forming in-
terpretations of other ﬁndings in the 
inﬂation and growth literature. In cross-
country growth regressions, for instance,
the ﬁnding has generally been that inﬂa-
tion is not robustly related to long-run
growth. Bruno and Easterly argue that
this is because the periods of collapse and
recovery approximately average out
among the countries that have experi-
enced inﬂation crises, so that it appears,
in the type of speciﬁcations that have typ-
ically been estimated, that inﬂation does
not inﬂuence growth. They also stress
that they ﬁnd no evidence of a reliable re-
lationship between inﬂation and growth
for low-inﬂation countries, and that inﬂa-
tion crises apparently have no lasting ef-
fects: Countries that experience inﬂation
crises tend to return to normal growth
once the crisis is over.
Jon Faust, in a discussion of the
paper, praises Bruno and Easterly for ex-
ploiting the time series properties of the
data to try to better understand the dy-
namics of inﬂation and growth. But he
also warns against interpreting the results
as evidence that inﬂation, even at very
high levels, is directly responsible for low-
ering growth, since the correlations estab-
lished in the paper say little about the di-
rection of causality. Kenneth West notes
that the paper usefully brings together 
the growth-regression literature with the
inﬂation-stabilization literature, but he is
somewhat skeptical that the authors have
satisfactorily interpreted the lack of a ro-
bust correlation between inﬂation and
growth documented in the former set of
papers.
The growth regression literature is
visited more directly in the paper by
Robert Barro, “Inﬂation and Growth.”
Barro reports on recent work in which a
standard convergence framework is used
to assess the effects of policy variables
like inﬂation on economic growth. The
data set covers more than 100 countries
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cross-sectional features. Many factors that
might affect growth are represented in the
regression speciﬁcations, and when inﬂa-
tion is included as an explanatory factor,
it enters with a signiﬁcantly negative coef-
ﬁcient for the full sample. The results for
the full sample suggest that a permanent
10 percentage point increase in inﬂation
would reduce the growth rate of real out-
put per capita on impact by about 0.02 to
0.03 percentage points per year. This re-
duction in the rate of economic growth is
the net effect of a change in the level of
per capita income, since the convergence
framework assumes the economy will re-
turn to its long-run growth rate in the
limit. Still, the level of output would be
some 4 to 7 percent lower after 30 years
under the regime of higher inﬂation.
Barro is careful to note that the statistical
signiﬁcance of this estimate disappears if
a set of high inﬂation countries are re-
moved from the sample. Barro then dis-
cusses the possibility that causality in the
results runs from growth to inﬂation,
rather than from inﬂation to growth. The
discussion emphasizes a response to
Kocherlakota’s comments, as well as the
possibility that the use of certain instru-
mental variables might help clarify this
matter.
In a discussion of the paper, Narayana
Kocherlakota employs a standard cash-in-
advance monetary model in which mone-
tary policy has no effect on the growth
rate of real output. In this model, he
shows that the equilibrium relationship
between the rate of inﬂation and the rate
of real output growth is negative. To get an
idea about the magnitude of this effect,
Kocherlakota calibrates the model and
ﬁnds that an econometrician would esti-
mate a coefﬁcient of about -0.024 in re-
sponse to a 10 percentage point increase 
in inﬂation. Since this is approximately
Barro’s estimate, he concludes that Barro’s
results are consistent with the idea that
there is no effect of inﬂation on growth.
Chris Sims emphasizes the single equation
aspect of the speciﬁcation estimated by
Barro, and suggests ways in which one
might interpret the equation as part of a
complete system. In the more complete
system, however, it is not clear how the
coefﬁcient Barro has estimated should be
interpreted.
SUMMARY
As this introduction makes clear, a
wide variety of issues and methodologies
were represented at this conference. A de-
ﬁnitive characterization of the relationship
between inﬂation and economic growth is
still far from the grasp of economic science,
but leading economists at the conference
emphasized many ingredients that will un-
doubtedly be important in some kind of ﬁ-
nal reckoning. The role of explicit models
of ﬁnancial intermediation in inﬂuencing
results in fully articulated macroeconomic
frameworks should not be underestimated,
for example. Similarly, there is much to
learn about the nature and inﬂuence of 
certain types of policy rules on the behav-
ior of macroeconomic systems. Despite the
concerns of policymakers, economists gen-
erally have little well-grounded advice to
dispense on the question of the optimal
structure of the international monetary sys-
tem, in part because research into coherent
models of international money is still in its
infancy. And reliable inferences from the
international data may require years of
careful work to be fully convincing. I hope
this collection of papers and remarks will
encourage further thoughtful research in
these areas, so that additional progress in
understanding the relationship between in-
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